The model of a decentralized project tokens allocation

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Abstract

The development of distributed ledger technologies (blockchain) led to the alternative ways to finance projects based on the issuance of tokens — digital accounting units in blockchain platforms. Unlike traditional financing mechanisms, the use of tokens allows for greater flexibility in fundraising and income and management rights allocation among stakeholders. An urgent problem that arises when using this mechanism is to determine the proportions in which tokens are distributed among the stakeholders of the project. Currently, this problem is solved by each project individually, based on its organizers’ subjective vision. In the article, the problem of token allocation of a decentralized project is investigated from the point of view of cooperative game theory. A token allocation model is considered in the form of a three-party cooperative game and the properties of its solutions are investigated, based on the core, Shapley value and nucleolus. The model allows to obtain estimates of rational token allocations corresponding to the participants’ contributions in the project, as well as stable to individual parties and their coalitions deviations. It also makes possible to solve the inverse problem of assessing the contribution of participants and their coalitions to the value of the project based on information about the past token allocation.

About the authors

G. V. Kolesnik

Plekhanov Russian Economic University

Email: kolesnik.gv@rea.ru
Moscow, Russia

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